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Long before I was thrown into the RHE 306 classroom, I took a Composition 
Survey seminar in which I was introduced to some of the dominant issues and research in 
the field. As I heard seasoned AIs discuss their experiences in their rhetoric classroom 
and came to know the structure of RHE 306 and 309 through their experience of it, at 
some point, I had a gut feeling I couldn’t shake—something about the teaching of this 
brand of rhetoric, of argument, felt like an anti-feminist activity. Not one to leave the gut 
un-interrogated, I determined to see if other feminists felt this way and why. I easily 
found other feminists in the literature who felt similarly, where advocating and 
implementing new methods and understandings of argument and rhetoric, but uncovering 
the why is/was more difficult. So as a sort of flotation device to assist you in your own 
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Congruent with the second wave of feminism and continuing into the 1990s, a 
group of feminist compositionists felt that argument should not have a major, if any, 
place in the feminist classroom and began to redefine, revision, and reposition argument. 
With a rhetorician’s bias, this report looks at one articulation of why they turned away 
from argument—Sally Miller Gearhart’s claim that “any intent to persuade is an act of 
violence”—, what they turned to, some critique surrounding their approaches and 
theories, and how a broader understanding of rhetoric and the role of agonism in rhetoric 
and education can add depth to the feminist approach.  
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I don’t know what I was thinking the weekend I came home from college wearing 
a piece of muslin with the screen-printed words “no war in Iraq” tied around my bicep. I 
don’t think I did it to rile my mother—although it could have been some form of latent 
teenage rebellion. And I don’t think I did it mischievously, intending to incite uproar 
around the Limbaugh-loving dinner table. I think I wore it out of conviction, or at least 
out of relief that I finally had a conviction: a side that, after much deliberation, I was on.  
“Deliberation” wasn’t over, however. My mother argued passionately, 
emotionally, from what she saw as the truth, from deeply held values, the same values I 
hold. It is no exaggeration to say that at that moment she saw my position as betrayal and 
my armband as evidence of a failure on her part as a parent. My dad’s role in the 
discussion/argument/conflict was more subdued, nearly entirely made up of factual 
interjections and clarifications: “Well, yes, but—” or “Now remember that—” or “Well, 
actually—”. My younger sister stared in disbelief, then dismissed my armband and me as 
she does all things she deems too stupid to engage, and remained silent. My brother was 
enjoying the display and took part with gusto, arguing both sides alternatively. In the 
meantime, I escaped to the kitchen where my dad found me later. Although I was entirely 
shut down, he played the part of arbitrator, coaxing me back onto the common ground we 
shared. But I didn’t go back to the table. 
My house has always been a deliberative house. Our favorite and frequent 
pastime is discussing various issues, principles, and ideas. When my armband and I came 
home that weekend, I fully expected to share the reasons behind my conviction while 
sitting at the table—this wasn’t the first serious or hot issue we’d discussed. I expected to 
 2 
be vigorously challenged, but not blasted and excluded to the kitchen. The tradition of 
discourse, the environment of inquiry I trusted, the deliberative house around me 
collapsed, making the question about war in Iraq moot. At that moment, standing in the 
shambles, I began to wonder just what had happened to cause this collapse and how to 
prevent it. Was it simply my position that forced me into the kitchen? Are some issues 
just too hot? Or was it my form? How and where do we argue passionately from our 
principles, especially when we disagree, without excluding those who oppose us? What 
does that space look like in groups of different sizes and different degrees of solidarity: in 
homes, classrooms, communities, academia, politics, and between countries? How do we 
reinforce discourse and buttress inquiry into the structure of our deliberative spaces? 
The answers to my litany of questions are not part of the scope of this paper but 
are rather part of a larger project I plan to pursue. These questions, however, are my 
driving force and function to move me forward in this project. I have no sufficiently 
narrow question here. I can, however, take my cue from Virginia Woolf1  and “develop in 
your presence as fully and freely as I can the train of thought” which has led me to the 
half-answers and additional questions I now have (4). Or, in other words, to describe the 
view. Beginning at the moment of deliberative collapse of the house I grew up in, the 
place where I felt the safest and trusted the most, and following it through my 
experiences and anxiety as a grad student, I hope to articulate the perspective I have 
gained on argumentation, pedagogy, and feminism. Since my armband days, I have both 
shied away from argument and become fixated on it. As a teacher and student, I am 
                                                
1 1 But, you may say, we asked you to write a Master’s Report, an academic argument.  Is it really 
necessary for me to quote Woolf, to use her introduction as a justification for my own style and insecurities 
here? I will try to explain. From my 3x5 cube that is the standard graduate-issue workspace, I sat down and 
attempted to dissect the model article I was given into an outline after which I could pattern my own paper. 
Like the narrator in A Room of One’s Own, “I soon saw that it had one fatal drawback” (3), although it took 
me a little longer to articulate what I saw. Woolf’s narrator can’t deliver the product her audience expects. I 
can’t deliver the expected product without compromising my content. 
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seeking to become something of a structural inspector determined to discover how to 
bring our deliberative houses up to code. And yet I keep one foot in the kitchen, bracing 
for the next collapse, hesitating to fully engage.  
What follows is research and critique based on the assumption that elements of 
discourse, more specifically argument, are structurally unsound to some degree, some 
exposition on how it got there, how others have tried to reinforce it, a barely formed and 
speculative plan for a prop of my own, and a smattering of personal narrative for good 
measure2.  
 
A View from the Kitchen  
Rhetoric always inscribes the relation of language and power at a particular 
moment. 
—Cheryl Glenn, Rhetorical Education in America 
 
As a feminist apologist, the irony of my place in the kitchen is not lost. Much of 
my time in grad school has been spent with one foot in the kitchen watching the table. 
Turns out, the kitchen is a room with a view. From my position, I have observed 
academic discourse around the seminar table, in lecture halls, in journals, and with my 
own students. As a composition enthusiast, this paper is an attempt to bring together these 
glimpses in a way that will help inform pedagogy, specifically within the composition 
classroom.  
I began research from the perspective of a feminist graduate student in rhetoric 
who hadn’t yet taught composition but was in a seminar that was a survey of 
composition. While sitting there listening to my peers discuss how an understanding of 
the rhetorical situation was a kind of panacea for some of the problems in composition, 
                                                
2 If the vagueness of my roadmap unsettles you, reader, feel free to refer back to the abstract for settlement. 
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my gut whispered to me something that turned out to be an echo of what other feminist 
compositionists felt almost a generation ago. Like Alexis Easley (and others), “I couldn’t 
help feeling that the teaching of argumentative writing was basically an anti-feminist 
activity” (30). Yet, as my gut couldn’t articulate how feminism and argumentative 
writing were in conflict, I turned to the research to answer this “how.” Though not 
immediately satisfying, what I found was provocative. 
A generation ago, ‘provocative’ perfectly describes Sally Miller Gearhart and her 
claim that “any intent to persuade is an act of violence” (195). Since its publication in 
1979, this claim, the thesis of her article, “The Womanization of Rhetoric,” resonated 
with a group of feminist compositionists teaching and writing in the 80s and early 90s, 
and, with her “indictment of our discipline of rhetoric,” Gearhart seems to have lit a fire 
under these compositionists who understood argument as a form of persuasion. In 
general, those who cite Gearhart felt that argument in the form they knew it, an 
adversarial display where opponents perform their position in a fight to the win, should 
not have a major, if any, place in the feminist classroom. They began to redefine, 
revision, and reposition argument which begat invitational rhetoric, adaptations of 
Rogerian rhetoric, modifications of oral forms and of mediation techniques, as well as 
triage pedagogical strategies, among other efforts. All of these were an attempt to support 
feminist values and pedagogical principles, which they felt were degraded, marginalized, 
or silenced by traditional argument. The fire burned hot for a little over a decade, but has 
now all but gone out.  It is an argument that needs sparking, despite the fact that those 
who oppose argument don’t like to argue.  
From my primary position as a student of rhetoric, however, my gut, although 
provoked, didn’t resonate with Gearhart’s claim as an answer for how argumentative 
writing and feminism seemed at odds. I had a broader view.  
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A Broader View: Some History of Rhetoric 
Persuasion is Aphrodite's daughter: it is she who beguiles our mortal hearts.  
—Saphho  
 
Beginning with the Sophists, there has always been a varying degree of anxiety 
about this possibility of inherent violence in rhetoric. Gorgias, however, isn’t too 
concerned and seems rather playful in his Encomium of Helen where he absolves Helen 
of Troy from any guilt in causing the Trojan War. One of his arguments here is the 
irresistible power of speech. In the section that represents a sort of hymn to the power of 
rhetoric, Gorgias compares the power of speech to a drug—  
For just as different drugs dispel different secretions from the body, and some 
bring an end to disease and others to life, so also in the case of speeches, some 
distress, others delight, some cause fear, others make the hearers bold, and some 
drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion. (46; par. 14) 
—which is why Helen should be exonerated. Renaissance rhetors were also 
anxious about the “disturbing, mysterious, unstable, and potentially destructive reaction 
that the rhetor is able to provoke in others" (Rebhorn  83). For them, rhetoric is at least a 
temptress (178). Gearhart uses the term “conversion” to describe this metaphor of 
seduction. But Wayne Rebhorn points out that the abundant sexual language in the 
Renaissance discourse on rhetoric goes beyond seduction and is, “at least potentially, a 
most sinister and troubling affair” (158).  
[F]or if the orator's performance constitutes a violent, irresistible sexual 
penetration of the auditor, then that performance looks uncomfortably like rape. 
Indeed, the discourse resonates with the word itself, which appears in barely 
disguised form every time a vernacular writer speaks of ravishment, and more 
directly in Latin texts whenever one encounters the verb rapere. (158)  
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Seduction isn’t sinister enough, as it is at least resistible and invokes a kind of 
pleasurable trickery, where rape3, an emotionally loaded term, conjures an ugly violation. 
Gorgias, although with less concern, also summons this metaphor, “that Helen similarly, 
against her will, might have come under the influence of speech, just as if ravished by the 
force of the might (45; par. 12). Like Gearhart, Gorgias compares the “influence of 
speech” to “the force of the might,” which shows up in Gearhart’s essay in the terms 
“conquest,” “invade,” and “violate” (Gearhart 196). Surprisingly, I find the comparison 
of persuasion to rape more intellectually acceptable because it is both more accurate and 
more useful than the broader statement that all persuasion is violent and even makes 
salvageable the claim that persuasion can be violent. Besides fitting nicely with a feminist 
critique of argument—violence against women, be it sexually or linguistically—rape is a 
more specific and complex term. Rape is something great gone horribly wrong. The sex 
act, the physical mechanics, are not criminal in and of themselves, but culpability occurs 
when sex is used wielded with force like a weapon. It is possible that argument itself is 
not the problem, just as sex itself is not the problem. Instead, we look at the significant 
difference in each case, which for rape is force and consent. So while persuasion can be 
like rape, whether it is depends on the intent of the persuader, at least for Gearhart.  
Thus the history of rhetoric provides some support for Gearhart’s claim, or at least 
her anxiety. And, although my entire class of committed pedagogue peers in that 
composition survey class dismissed her and her article practically outright, and although 
Gearhart generated no more than five minutes of discussion among us in 2007 before we 
moved on to another article, and although there is much exaggerated language and a 
                                                
3 Even as I make the comparison, I begin to feel sick. I do not make the comparison lightly or to play on 
emotions. Intellectually, I know it is valid and furthers my understanding and possibly others, but having 
been close to an actual rape, I understand how even the word reproduces trauma. I apologize for the 
possible reactions to you, reader, because I know firsthand how unfathomably common rape still is. 
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distinct hippie accent which are much too easy to smile at (“it is only in density that the 
energy we generate in our minds or our psyches differs from our auras” (196)), and 
although her claims are dramatic (“the womanization of culture that I believe is necessary 
for the survival of the planet” (198)) and there are clear contradictions in her argument 
(for one, she is making an aggressive argument against aggressive argument), I think her 
argument deserves another look, another view. Not despite her extremism, but because of 
it. Not just because she caused so much discussion a few decades ago, but because 
Gearhart brought a new voice—a female and feminist one—to bear against the centuries-
old male anxiety about rhetoric’s potential inherent violence, a voice which was heard for 
a while and then drowned out, disparaged, or ignored.  I don’t think the conversation got 
its day. Or its day was too short.  
In the section that follows, I hope to describe more specifically what Gearhart 
means by violence in order to explore what it was about Gearhart’s article that resonated 
with such a large group of feminists. Eventually, I also hope to borrow and transform 
elements of Gearhart’s critique into a new voice that articulates what my gut was trying 
to tell me: what is wrong with argument today.  
 
A Lingering View 
Gearhart sees rhetoric as salvageable only when it becomes disassociated with 
persuasion and aligned closer to communication. The ‘womanization’ in her title refers to 
this “fortunate shift in perspective” (195). Gearhart sees a continued need to move away 
from an androcentric view of the world. As Elizabeth Flynn describes it, "men have 
chronicled our historical narratives and defined our fields of inquiry” (425) without a 
female perspective. Gearhart locates the overt and overly male influence of rhetoric in its 
focus on persuasion and in the power it assumes a speaker has to change his audience. In 
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the discussion that follows, it is important to note that, for some, rhetoric is limited to a 
definition of persuasion and/or argument and does not include a broader concept of 
language or of persuasion. For them, the term cannot be recuperated, and it is not possible 
to designate appropriate or ethical uses of rhetoric.  
As a rhetorician, Gearhart doesn’t attack persuasion straight on; it’s the intent to 
persuade, or the intent to change another, which she says the “patriarchs of rhetoric” have 
never questioned, that is so damaging. Or, as I see it, the distinction between sex and 
rape. Of course Gearhart wants change, or she’d have no reason to write her article. 
Change itself is not the issue: rather “the act of violence is in the intention to change 
another” (196). As I understand Gearhart, when within the speaker is an intention to 
change the audience, then the discourse issuing from the speaker constitutes an act of 
violence—traditional rhetoric. One can engage in discourse without this intention, and 
then the act becomes ethical—rhetoric as communication.  
Much of the misinterpretation or outright dismissal of Gearhart can be attributed 
to the ambiguity within the word “intention.” For example, “intent” has specific 
implications and functions in the legal field and the criminal world which are lost on the 
layperson. Those with a legal fluency, like Richard Fulkerson, among others, might find 
it difficult to reconcile Gearhart’s use of the term with the legal implications of “intent.” 
Although Gearhart does not explicitly discuss what she means by “intent,” some 
inferences can be drawn from her description of the “conquest/conversion” model of 
discourse. For Gearhart, intent isn’t just mildly hoping, or even vigorously wanting 
change. Intent is the single-minded resolve which precedes an action, that which will 
bring it to pass—the driving force. One may want change, as Gearhart herself does, but if 
one does so along the conquest model, by imposition and with force, then that desire to 
change becomes an intent to change, an act of violence.  
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According to Gearhart, the conquest/conversion model of human interaction is a 
“very male chauvinist model, one which not only implied but explicitly assumed that all 
the power was in the speaker, just as we believed at one point in history that all power 
was in the sperm” (199). Recognizing that there is at least equal power in the listener is a 
large part of Gearhart’s project, a part which doesn’t get much play in the literature 
perhaps because there is no catchy phrase and provocative indictment to encapsulate it. 
Imbuing both the speaker and listener with power is the beginning of dialogue, the form 
which Gearhart sees as necessary for saving the discipline of rhetoric. I would point out, 
though, that the listener, like the womb, has always had power whether history 
acknowledges it or not.  
On the one hand, Gearhart wants to argue that the problem with rhetoric has been 
an undue focus on the speaker without acknowledging the autonomy of the listener. She 
wants to argue for the inherent power of the listener while at the same time describing a 
situation of violence which depends on the speaker being all-powerful. Her description of 
violence demonstrates a kind of complicity in dismissing the power of the listener as it 
reinscribes the powerlessness of the listener. It is robbing the listener of power that yields 
the real violence. Which brings us back to the history of rhetoric. The anxiety of 
Renaissance rhetors comes from the assumption that Gearhart describes: a powerless 
audience, a defenseless and ripe victim for the penetrating assault of the rhetor. In such a 
situation persuasion becomes manipulation, propaganda masquerading as eloquence.   
Similarly, conquest and conversion are not part of the same model, at least not 
according to my understanding of conversion with my particular religious orientation. 
While conquest is a clear misuse of power by the speaker, conversion imbues the listener 
with a power that Gearhart says traditional rhetoric has repudiated. The kind of 
conversion I have experienced and observed is aligned with Middle English origins of the 
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word, connoting a “turning” and a transformation, a self-motivated change. This kind of 
understanding of conversion is exactly congruent with the way Gearhart describes ethical 
rhetoric and ethical change because it routes power to the listener. And yet, recalling 
Gearhart’s procreative reference—it takes two. Both speaker and listener should share 
responsibility in the persuasion. The persuaded is complicit in the persuasion as is the 
persuader.  
On the other hand, traditional rhetoric has had an undue focus on the potential 
power of the speaker, and I believe this emphasis does cause violence. I am persuaded by 
the way Gearhart recalls that the old cliché that “the pen is mightier than the sword” is 
built on the comparison that both pen and sword are tools capable of being used for the 
same end. Whether with “whips or rifles,” or with rhetoric’s “language and 
metalanguage, with refined functions of the mind,” a weapon is a weapon, and rhetoric is 
“not excuse[d] from the mindset of the violent” (195). I would add that anything can be a 
tool for violence and recall a more recent cliché (if you can call a bumper sticker a 
cliché): “guns don’t kill people, people kill people.” The focus needs to shift from 
potential weapons to those who wield them. Thus, Gearhart doesn’t attack the tools of 
rhetoric but rather advocates a change in our use of those tools, which I emphatically 
support. At the same time, Gearhart cautions: “Yet where the intent is to change another, 
the difference between a persuasive metaphor and a violent artillery attack is obscure and 
certainly one of degree rather than kind [emphasis added]” (197). Weapons can cause 
violence, different weapons can cause violence to different degrees.  
To that end, Gearhart attempts to imagine a different model of rhetoric and 
communication, one which is less invasive and penetrative in the patriarchal sense and 
more feminine and feminist in that it is inviting, drawing out, and womb-like. She 
describes the role of rhetoricians as creators of an environment for change where the 
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change is self-motivated. This is the only ethical way Gearhart sees that a rhetor of 
integrity can bring about change. Gearhart boldly articulates a position which still has 
merit, as it is shortsighted to think that a wave or two of feminism is enough to 
“womanize” any field, especially one as old and as reverent of the past as rhetoric. With 
revolutionary-style vigor, her article is a picket-line chant outside the patriarchal tower. 
Those inside see her as a contradictory crazy extremist—like one who bombs an abortion 
clinic in the name of the “sanctity of life”—as she argues violently against violence4. It is 
her form that critics so quickly attack so they can dismiss her extreme claims without 
fully engaging, without listening. They do not hear the depth, the point of her extremism, 
and thus rob her of the power she claims speakers can wield in a kind of rhetorical 
emasculation.   
No question, there are valid critiques to bring to bear against Gearhart. Their 
validity, however, should be based first on the sharpness of the ear listening to her 
argument and not solely on the sharpness of the pen used to counter it. There are two 
valid critiques and pertinent segues made by Susan Jarratt in “The Case for Conflict.” 
She notes that, first, the “problems with Gearhart’s proposal arise in the details of the 
communication context she envisions” (107), details which Foss, Foss, and Griffin 
directly attempt to fill in with their Invitational Rhetoric and which other feminists 
attempt to address in their pedagogical strategies discussed below. But, besides being 
vague, Gearhart “fails to anticipate the emergence of differences among groups” in her 
                                                
4 I have been appalled, and thus probably defensive, as I have read some shallow 
critiques, another kind of violence, of Gearhart by scholars I had previously thought of as 
composition giants. From them, she receives no benefit of the doubt in her choice and 
mastery of a classic style, for crafting such a controversial and abrasive (as in polishing 
and cleaning) thesis and little credit for the rethinking it caused. It has caused me to be 
more skeptical of other’s reviews and more committed to listening and has had a large 
influence on the outcome of this project. 
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idealism that women can heal the world and make it a better place, putting women on that 
same problematic pedestal (108). In their history, both rhetoric and feminism have often 
been utopic to a fault. In this case, the fault is assuming the victim is innocent and 
superior to the oppressor, which then has the potential to become replacing the patriarchy 
with a feminarchy. As recent case law shows, women can now be guilty of rape, too. 
Rather than describe the charge of essentialism so prevalent and threatening to the 
credibility of these feminist’s projects, I’m simply going to mention here that it exists and 
move on. From my perspective, the cry of essentialism, while valid, has been sounded too 
loud and long and is drowning out the voices I want to be heard here.  
 
Womb with a View 
Feminism is an ideology of change which [sic] rises out of the experiences of 
women, out of the experiences of our bodies, our experiences of our conditioning 
both in our individual lives and over the centuries.  
—Sally Miller Gearhart, “The Womanization of Rhetoric”  
 
More or less united under the above definition of feminism, a group of “cultural 
feminists” were directly influenced by Gearhart despite the confrontational delivery of 
her message. A brand of feminism which Elizabeth Flynn describes as promoting 
“‘women’s ways,’ ways which often result from women's biological and social roles” 
(qtd in Graves 6), these cultural feminists ascribe to a pedagogy which feels itself 
fundamentally in conflict with patriarchal discourse, including argument. A large 
group—probably proportionally related to the number of composition programs which 
privileged an expressivist approach—of these feminists concerned themselves with what 
writing outside the patriarchal tradition, or writing as women, might look like. The site of 
this revision was often experimental writing classes for women (Annas, Osborn, Daümer 
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and Runzo, among others) which explored forms beyond argument. A smaller group took 
issue with traditional argument. That forming an argument or teaching how to do so 
constitutes an “intent to change” and thus an “act of violence” was so self-evident, many 
feminists didn’t bother to articulate the connection. It was enough to cite Gearhart and 
move on to a solution.  
According to these feminists, argument is problematic when it is adversarial, 
monologic, patriarchal, masculine, antagonistic, combative, hierarchical, polarized, 
inauthentic, and competitive—meaning a goal of winning. Instead of an argument which 
silences, degrades, alienates, excludes, lectures, and passes judgment and imposes a 
hierarchy of ideas or values, they want a discourse form which encourages questions and 
the tentative exploration of ideas, cultivates a desire to understand, and supports 
inclusion, cooperation, and dialogue. In general, the kind of discourse form they are 
striving for comes out of feminist values and pedagogical goals rather than rhetoric or 
argumentation theory. Since, according to the editors of Feminism and Composition, 
“inclusion is one of the central feminist projects” (Kirsch et al. 10), traditional argument 
and the conflict it can bring lies outside of the scope of feminism when it alienates and 
excludes. For many cultural feminists, the classroom should be a nurturing environment, 
devoted to collaboration, cooperation, and empathy (Graves 6). With this objective in the 
foreground, many creative pedagogical approaches developed.  
In 2005, Kathleen Hunzer’s article, “Diversifying Our Views of Argument: 
Dialogue, Respect, and Feminist Rhetoric,” provides a distillation of this perspective. 
Synthesizing the work of those who have gone before, Hunzer’s recent work, the only 
one I’ve found, is a representative example of this kind of approach, which I’ll call 
practical. With an emphasis on addressing the problem of argument in the trenches of the 
classroom and the academic world, Hunzer, like the other practical compositionists, 
 14 
identifies a feminist pedagogical goal and then develops ways to achieve it in her 
classroom. For example, the values of community and the privileging of dialogue over 
monologue, derived from Gearhart, result in Hunzer’s goal to create a dialogic 
community. To do this, she requires everyone to sit in a semi-circle, structures the 
syllabus around questions instead of topics, and sets up a digital discussion board. In the 
process, Hunzer believes she is able to revise argument. The bulk of her article is spent in 
outlining feminist pedagogical goals and describing how to achieve them, with the 
standard theory section, a “non exhaustive summary,” playing a minor role. 
Others, like Catherine Lamb, couch their approach more explicitly in theory. For 
Lamb in “Beyond Argument in Feminist Composition,” it is a feminist theory of power 
which leads her to “suggest a means by which [feminist composition can] include an 
approach to argument, ways to proceed if one is in conflict with one’s audience” (11). 
Lamb still uses argument in her classroom; however, it is not the end product but rather a 
beginner step to help students articulate their position. The end Lamb comes up with is an 
adaptation of the oral forms of mediation and negotiation to the composition classroom—
students work in groups to mediate or negotiate a solution to the problem they have been 
researching. But the forms are meaningless without the knowledge that “the forms are 
expressions of writer/reader relationships which reflect an understanding of power 
consistent with feminist values,” the same kind of ethical power relationship Gearhart 
champions (22). Lamb doesn’t present mediation and negotiation as “The Answer” to the 
problem of patriarchal discourse. Rather, she sees them as a solution that works now and 
may prove to be no more than provisional. With use, “the forms themselves will change 
to mirror our evolving understanding of what we are constructing” (22).  
Throughout her essays (1991-2002), Lamb continues to talk about an idea of 
spaciousness in discourse, “how to enter that space and keep it open, developing a sense 
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of spaciousness in the resolution of the conflict” (“Voices” 156). A spacious discourse is 
one which does not exclude keeping everyone within and engaged in the space of 
discourse or, in my terms, staying seated at the table. In “Beyond Argument,” Lamb 
describes how traditional or monologic argument, as “a mode in which one’s goal is to 
persuade another to one’s point of view,” is also a crossroads. It can change the ethical 
power dynamic and close that space when “what we want comes first, and we use the 
available means of persuasion to get it” (“Beyond” 13). Although she cites Gearhart and 
is personally sympathetic to the force and violence contained in much discourse, Lamb 
has no categorical problem with persuasion in the broadest sense. For Lamb, violence 
occurs “only if any invitation to redefine oneself is seen as invasive” (“Voices” 164). 
Lamb’s pedagogy seeks a use of power which is consistent with the feminist value of 
interconnectedness, and mediation is one discourse form which supports that. She sees 
mediation as changing "the conception of power … from something that can be possessed 
and used on somebody to something that is available to both and has at least the potential 
of being used for the benefit of both" (“Beyond” 18). Like sex. 
In the 1991 article, “Beyond Argument,” unity and the resolution of conflict get 
foregrounded, something she recognizes in her 2002 article, “Other Voices, Different 
Parties: Feminist Responses to Argument,” in that “advocating mediation or negotiation 
may also be seen as an emphasis on coming to closure” (“Voices” 159). Her chosen form, 
mediation, pursues a different goal than monologic argument. Instead of the goal to win 
that Lamb associates with traditional argument and persuasion, mediation privileges 
agreement, seeking to arrive at a solution acceptable to all sides. As her thinking and 
practice progresses, Lamb begins to address the potential harm “an artificial emphasis on 
finding a solution at the expense of really exploring the nature of the conflicts involved” 
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can cause (“Voices” 159). From here it is easy to see how this anti-argument sentiment 
becomes dangerous when it progresses to a position which is anti-conflict.  
The initial focus of feminists, or at least cultural feminists, was on developing a 
personal voice, which coincided with ignoring conflict, defined as disagreement, and 
describes the sense of heightened idealism (“Voices” 156). In Lamb’s later work, she is 
interested in ways of responding to conflict, where previously she was centered on 
making it all go away (mediation and negotiation). It’s not the “male mode” of 
responding to conflict but the goal to win an argument that makes “confrontation 
virtually inevitable” (“Voices” 157). Confrontation changes the power relationship into 
one that breaks down interconnectedness, becomes power-over instead of a subject-
subject relationship, and narrows the spaciousness that is essential for ethical and 
inclusive discourse (“Voices” 158).  
Instead of confrontation and as a supplement to mediation, Lamb then introduces 
the barest idea of another tool with a lot of potential for dealing with conflict and 
widening the discourse space—response, similar to Gearhart’s vague discussion of 
listening and creating an environment of change. When one is “responding,” it is not 
important to take an “explicit position; the emphasis instead is on broadening the context 
in which the discussion takes place, creating openings” between poles, allowing for a 
whole spectrum of positions to exist within the conversation (“Voices” 163). What rises 
to the foreground is a commitment that the conversation continue instead of the speaker’s 
position or performance or even resolution of the conflict itself. The advanced skill 
required to effectively function as a responder in the way that Lamb describes might not 
fit within the scope of the basic composition class, but it is related to the approach of 
Alexis Easley.  
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While many attempted to discover, through a flourishing of women’s writing and 
a feminine or feminist style, an alternative or a revision of traditional argument as a 
discourse form, and some imagined what might replace argument, Alexis Easley offers 
another approach to deal with this “contradiction between teaching argumentation and 
feminist pedagogy” (30). Simple and unexpected, Easley’s approach advocates not trying 
to resolve the contradiction but instead presenting “the conflict to our students as a 
conflict” (30) and then cultivate the self-consciousness and reflective skills needed to 
understand it as such. While I initially saw Easley’s approach as a kind of copout, as I 
have listened closer to her argument, I have seen the power in the simplicity of her 
approach.  
First of all, Easley embraces what many other feminists shy away from—
conflict—and uses it as a teaching moment. She does see argumentation as masculine and 
potentially problematic, but also understands the important role it plays in gaining access. 
Easley says that clear, forceful argumentation is an important skill "in order [for students] 
to become full participants in their academic discourse," especially for women (30). But 
she also teaches them “to have a more ethical self-awareness and responsibility in their 
argumentative practice” (30). In doing so, Easley is beginning the process of “changing 
the use of our own tools” that Gearhart advocates (196), and she does this through 
creating dialogue about the “conflict encounter” (Gearhart 198). It is the conflict between 
feminism and the teaching of argumentative writing that Easley uses to encourage 
reflectiveness. Easley may be an unwitting rhetorician.  
Her first step to teaching students argumentative writing is to have them discover 
the rules across disciplines, which they research cooperatively. Then she asks them to 
“examine the sorts of metaphors, structures, and assumptions used across the disciplines 
and discuss what sorts of cultural values and ethics they inscribe” (34). By introducing 
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readings, having students write reflectively about them, and then discussing and 
analyzing them in class, students begin to see and then are able to “question the 
underlying assumptions of all forms of argumentation” so that they can become “more 
self-conscious in their appropriation of the rhetorical conventions of academic and 
professional discourse communities” (35). Basically, Easley is teaching her students 
rhetoric—that academic writing is located within a rhetorical situation, which, it turns 
out, is a kind of panacea to many of the problems within composition, as long as it is 
ethically situated. Such self-consciousness that is a component of rhetoric provides a kind 
of critical distance to an issue that can keep the discourse space open or keep us seated at 
the table whether we agree or not. 
 
The Case for Conflict 
The more I have researched and thought about the concepts and ideas that arise in 
the juncture of feminism, argumentation, and pedagogy, the less need I have felt to 
discuss conflict. The better I get at listening to what certain of these feminists are saying, 
the clearer I see that the case for conflict has already been won. The point of clarification 
that still needs to be made is what kind of conflict we are talking about. Some of those 
who are wary of feminist approaches seem to simplify what feminists are doing as 
eschewing all conflict—both the conflict that naturally arises from diversity as well as the 
kind of conflict that is engaged in like battle. We can be in conflict and be engaged 
without waging a war, even if it is just with words. And yet, according to the literature, 
there are those among feminist and process pedagogues who in their zeal for 
collaboration also conflated these meanings of conflict.  
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In Susan Jarratt’s essay, “Feminism and Composition: The Case for Conflict,” she 
outlines several unsettling incidents that surfaced because of an overly accepting 
classroom climate that shunned conflict. Jarratt argues that such an approach leaves 
“those who adopt it insufficiently prepared to negotiate the oppressive discourses of 
racism, sexism, and classism surfacing in the composition classroom” (106). In our 
society, this kind of pedagogy can actually further marginalize women and other 
minorities in the call for unity and solidarity. Bill Karis, responding to the general trend 
toward collaboration in composition classrooms in the late 1980s, cautions: “to the extent 
that this privileging of compromise effectively limits free and open dialogue among 
collaborators, this inclination toward compromise is damaging,” particularly when unity 
is emphasized at the beginning of the collaborative process (114). It turns out that 
collaboration as well as conflict can narrow the spaciousness in discourse that Lamb 
advocates, and for Easley, it can undermine our pedagogy.  The “greatest barrier to 
learning in college classrooms” is most often "peaceful acquiescence, not violent 
combativeness” (Easley 35).  Jarratt says that this ideal and false unity can result in “a 
superficial suturing of real social divisions” (110). And Mary Ellen Dakin, a secondary 
education teacher writing in English Journal eloquently puts it,   
I have learned more from discord than from harmony. When discord speaks in 
measured cadence … I hear notes I missed on my own. Yet even when it has 
shouted in my face and called me names, discord has taught me to clarify my 
thinking, to defend my beliefs, and to speak truth to power. (12) 
I admire Dakin’s relationship with discord, and yet I don’t think it’s universal. I seek to 
replicate it in myself and in my students, but I don’t want to neglect the learning 
opportunities in harmony. Discord or conflict, like harmony or unity, are not vehicles for 
learning. They are each just different kinds of fuel burning at different temperatures. 
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A View from the Parlor 
I felt the heat my first semester in grad school; it was worse than an intellectual 
hazing. One seminar stands out as being particularly scorching. On the first day of class, 
the professor told us he wanted us to run the discussion. “Contradict each other, tell her 
she’s wrong, tell him he’s an idiot if he thinks that, really be engaged. Shout at each 
other.” To this professor, the deliberative space of a seminar was one where we were at 
each other’s throats. For him, that equated active participation. I imagine he was 
describing in his own way what Kenneth Burke in The Philosophy of Literary Form 
describes below: 
Imagine that you enter a parlor. You come late. When you arrive, others have 
long preceded you, and they are engaged in a heated discussion, a discussion too 
heated for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is about. In fact, the 
discussion had already begun long before any of them got there, so that no one 
present is qualified to retrace for you all the steps that had gone before. You listen 
for a while, until you decide that you have caught the tenor of the argument; then 
you put in your oar. Someone answers; you answer him; another comes to your 
defense; another aligns himself against you, to either the embarrassment, or the 
gratification of your opponent, depending upon the quality of your ally’s 
assistance. However, the discussion is interminable. The hour grows late, you 
must depart. And you do depart, with the discussion still vigorously in progress. 
(110–111) 
The discussion in both my seminar and the parlor is uncomfortably hot. It also 
uses terms that recall combat: “opponent,” “ally,” “coming to your defense,” and “aligns 
against you” which seem at odds with the civil setting of the metaphor—a parlor. 
Although the conversation is vigorous and engaging, there is no mention of action or 
practice: just continuous discussion. This is a mode to which cultural feminists would 
object and what Lamb and others categorize as adversarial. But the approach also 
descends from a deeply rooted tradition initially introduced to me by Walter J. Ong 
described as agonism.  
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In his 1982 “Orality and Literacy,” Ong attaches the Greek word ‘agon’ to ‘a 
contest’ (110–111). In Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciouness, Ong goes 
to great lengths to specifically identify what he means by contest. It’s kind of like 
contention, but not; similar to competition, but not. It has elements of conflict, but more. 
Contest is  
a struggle, earnest, possibly but not at all necessarily lethal or even unfriendly, 
between […] human beings, entered into to determine dominance of one or 
another sort. The dominance cn be purely ludic, as in a game of amateur sport, or 
existentially real, as in a lawcase or in war. (44–45). 
Ong’s contest can contain any degree of antagonism between participants as long as the 
participants are earnestly engaged. The function of this struggle is to determine 
dominance, which has a ceremonial component manifested in either real stakes or, in 
their absence, an assumed ludic attitude.  
Ludic or real, ceremonial or not, dominance is an easy and natural target for not 
just the feminist. In Ong’s basic definition we already see the seeds of what feminists 
protest in argument: hierarchy, adversarial, a goal of winning. On the one hand, the goal 
of dominance would seem to narrow argument and close down the discourse space. And 
yet, at least for Ong, the goal of dominance seems to open it. It may be that the 
ceremonial stance may function to diffuse to some degree the dominance or provide 
distance between competitors—“it’s not personal, it’s just business”—creating space for 
growth. Ong points to the development and flourishing of the university system as 
evidence for the success of agonism as he believes contest has functioned “more or less 
directly to shape the noetic world itself, and specifically its academic development” (28). 
According to Ong, “contest has been a major factor in organic evolution and it 
turns out to have been a major, and indeed seemingly essential, factor in intellectual 
development” (28). Contest “generates intellectual structures, the structures that make 
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science itself “(47). While there is some validity in the idea that intellectual structures are 
born out of struggle, Ong becomes more than problematic when he basically denies 
women participation to contest on biological grounds. We aren’t aggressive enough to 
engage in contest. “A mother seems to absorb aggression …. Anatomically males are not 
fitted for this creative absorption [intercourse] of aggression and its transformation into 
life [pregnancy]” (40–41). Men, therefore, take their aggression and create intellectual 
structures. Women take men’s aggression and create biological structures. Although Ong 
does admit that women do think, and even read, he still excludes them biologically from 
real participation in contest.  
Coming back to the first word of Ong’s definition of agonism, “struggle,” is, for 
me, what is salvageable and worth saving from his sociobiological treatise. That one 
word has more in common and in cause with others who also provide definitions of 
agonism; as Debra Hawhee points out in her article “Agonism and Aretê” “the agôn is 
more than the one-on-one sparring which is emphasized in most treatments of the topic” 
(185). There are understandings of agonism that are not so dependent on the problematic 
idea of dominance and that can enrich the practice of argument in any classroom. And 
women can struggle, too.  
Hawhee5 extends agonism beyond a synonym for competition and detaches it 
from the goal to win by introducing another Greek word, athlios, which was used for 
outcome-driven competition or when contending for a prize (185). “Whereas athlios 
emphasizes the prize and hence the victor, agôn emphasizes the event of the gathering 
                                                
5 I do not yet read Greek, and I will never be a classicist. What is important in the 
following paragraphs is not historicity or the authority of those I cite or the validity of 
their interpretations because I’m not qualified to evaluate those. I can, however, see the 




itself—the encounter rather than the division between the opposite sides” (185–186). 
Such a distinction narrows agonism to this idea of struggle, the moment or process or 
“movement through struggle … wherein subjective production takes place through the 
encounter itself” (186). The idea that struggle is productive echoes Ong’s description of 
how contest develops intellectual structures, and it does so without recalling dominance. 
It might be too much to add how nicely the idea of gathering, and the community and 
interconnectedness it connotes, fits within feminist principles. Either way, it seems 
possible to divorce agonism from domination and perhaps allow a paradigm where 
agonism and cooperation are on the same side.  
In 1997, and without invoking feminist frames, Lynch, Cooper, and George 
attempted just that in their article “Moments of Argument: Agonistic Inquiry and 
Confrontational Cooperation.” In a field enamored with cooperation, Lynch et al. began 
to wonder if “the whole point of argumentation is being lost in our talk about cooperation 
and collaboration, that we are losing the value of challenging, opposing, and resisting” 
(63). They want to find a way to cash in on what struggle has to offer without 
bankrupting the assets of cooperation. They “want to see argument as agonistic inquiry or 
as confrontational cooperation, a process in which people struggle over interpretations 
together, deliberate on the nature of the issues that face them, and articulate and 
rearticulate their positions in history, culture, and circumstance” (63). They want to have 
their cake and eat it, too. And they seem to accomplish it. The one small snag is that, 
while not avoiding argument, their students’ writing did not always look like argument 
but did look more like analysis. They seem to successfully negotiate “the threat of 
struggle” which “always carries with it the reflex action of retrenchment, a retreat back 
into isolation and defended difference,” (68) a fall back to the “narrowness and 
simplicity” of traditional debate (64). They contain the fear and risk by deemphasizing it 
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and by cultivating an attitude that sees argumentation as a social, connecting activity 
rather than an aggressive agonistic one (68). It appears their students achieve what Bill 
Karis calls for, that “they should engage in free and open dialectic, recognizing that 
substantive conflict is collaboration too” (124). 
A hallmark of their courses is delaying, as much as possible, their students’ rush 
to take sides and dig into a position. They are wary of the empty pro-con argumentation 
modeled in “the incredible poverty of political discourse in which we are awash,” (Jarratt, 
“Reflections” 343) and recognize, as Evelyn Westbrook’s research shows, that an 
“overemphasis on conflict and pro-con argumentation urges students to adopt simplified 
positions and encourages eristic debate at the expense of inquiry” (Westbrook 341). 
Westbrook analyzed the 1842-1847 archives of the Clariosophic Society of South 
Carolina College, a student-run literary and debate society, to see if pro-con 
argumentation impacted their beliefs. Voting to decide the question at the end of the 
debate indicated no change. Society members’ journals demonstrated members didn’t 
even consider changing. Her conclusions are a challenge to “the two claims critical 
pedagogues often make—that agonistic debate challenges both dominant ideologies and 
students’ beliefs” (340).  
Perhaps the most common experience of agonism today within the composition 
classroom is a feeble incarnation of pro-con argumentation, which, in a less than ludic 
way, sets up contestants in a pithy squabble for dominance. Such an encounter makes a 
mock of the ceremony so important to Ong, strips struggle of the power to produce 
anything, reinscribes students’ already held beliefs or worse, bores them to death, and 
makes grading position papers painful grading for composition teachers. My experience 
of pro-con argumentation leads me to offer two pros to the long list of cons. First, it 
provides another side to the issue for those who only see one side. Second, it sets up 
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conditions where a productive struggle is at least possible. Beyond that, however, I have 
yet to discover the potential empowerment Thomas Sloane discusses in the introduction 
of his book, On the Contrary: The Protocol of Traditional Rhetoric 6. For Sloane, pro-con 
argumentation is central to understanding rhetoric and how to think like a rhetorician (3). 
Also, “from a development point of view, learning to argue may be a crucial phase in 
learning to think” (6). But where pro-con argumentation leads to ignoring ambiguity and 
a simplification of complexity, the kind of thinking it teaches is not deep or desirable. 
 
Agonism in Education 
Many of the scholars discussed above have noted the central place agonism has 
had in education, although, in the case of Ong and Hawhee, I suspect the marks of 
agonism are different. Hawhee tells us that “the Greeks produced themselves through 
active struggle; their pedagogy depended on agonism” (186).  Feminist compositionist 
Susan Osborn describes Ong’s perspective better than I want to: “traditional rhetoric 
developed in the past as an expression on the ‘rational level’ of ‘ceremonial combat’” and 
that rhetoric, education in rhetoric, and all education has “focused on defending a 
position (thesis) or attacking the position of another person” (259).  In his Composition-
Rhetoric: Backgrounds, Theory, and Pedagogy, Robert J. Connors describes rhetoric’s 
agonistic legacy in less specific terms. “Classical rhetoric is, plain and simple, about 
fighting, ritual fighting with words, and this agonistic tone carried over into all rhetorical 
study up until the nineteenth century” (27) when women entered college.  Connors seems 
to support Gearhart’s indictment of the inherent violence of rhetoric. The difference is 
                                                
6 Of course, I haven’t finished the book. I’m excited to be persuaded by him.  
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that Connor, and Ong for that matter, praise the violence because it is ritualized and 
noetic.  
Despite Connor’s claim that the entrance of women into college, which “changed 
the most basic rhetorical rules of engagement, and from cold, distanced, demanding 
lecture-recitation teaching and agonistic competition, rhetoric after 1900 became at its 
most typical a personalized editorial relationship, critical but not usually antagonistic” 
agonism is still with us (44). Osborn, like most other feminist pedagogues, point to 
contemporary textbooks that still teach students to take an adversarial posture, declare an 
opponent, and attack. Connors mourns the fall of agonism in our educational institutions. 
And it’s all women’s fault. I, however, mourn that it, like rhetoric, often exists for our 
students as a wan and mute straw man.   
In some ways, agonism and argument are identical twins—one gets confused for 
the other when they are distinct, though similar, entities. It is possible that the violence 
feminists responded to after Gearhart’s clarion call was a case of mistaken identity. 
Agonism, when coupled with dominance as in Ong’s definition, can support much of the 
blame for what often goes wrong with argument. The feminist project of re-visioning 
argument must first wipe agonism out of its eyes. Agonism, however, has much potential 
to be renewed, and, for Sloane, when correctly understood, we focus in on the promise of 
struggle. Sloane argues that rhetoricians like Erasmus, while appearing to be eristic in 
their use of pro-con argumentation, did not seek to perpetuate the conditions of 
antagonism and strife: “they sought, rather, to serve as midwives, to assist the readers to 





Another Womb with a View: Argument as Maieutic 
 
Many modern educationists will dislike the view of rhetoric I offer. For it is 
ostensibly based on antagonism, hostility, strife, competitiveness, indeed all those 
objectionably male-oriented qualities modern education is seeking to ‘go beyond.’ 
When skillfully applied, I shall argue, rhetoric too actually seeks to go beyond 
those qualities. For rhetoric at certain points abandons antagonism and enters into 
an intellectual process that the rhetoric-hater Socrates calls maieutic, midwifery, a 
role women have traditionally performed. 
—Thomas O. Sloane, On the Contrary 
 
The day this report is submitted and I fulfill the last requirement to receive my 
Masters will mark the one-year anniversary that I received another hard-won title—that 
of mother. Contractions began at 37 weeks and didn’t climax to active labor until the end 
of week 42. Once I entered active labor, I dwelt in it for 27 hours, the first 14 hours more 
than manageable with the preparations I had made and the support of my husband and 
midwife. When I stalled out at seven centimeters and failed to progress for ten hours, I 
began to understand what struggle meant. When I hit transition, I doubted my body’s 
ability to do anything but explode or die. Pushing was forcefully quick and when, in the 
dim light, I first locked eyes with my baby, I was stunned. My daughter’s birth was the 
most profound and beautiful thing that I have ever experienced.   
Besides dramatizing struggle, I describe this sacred and yet common experience 
because I know that, in today’s society, it is not common to feel so sweetly about labor 
and delivery (or about midwives). The birth of a child is as much agony (also from the 
Greek agon) as it is miracle. Learning should be hard—a struggle in the best most 
productive sense of the word. Teaching as midwifery offers another metaphor for women 
teachers that doesn’t have the problems of the mother metaphor or doctor metaphor. Our 
role is to help our students birth their own ideas. In this situation, struggle does not mean 
positioning one student or viewpoint against another. It also adds another understanding 
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of force that isn’t power-over but power-with and supports the notion that rushing to 
choose a position or side is pre-mature. The maieutic metaphor is one that I, as a feminist 
compositionist, see as potentially transformative. It is a feminist approach to agonism. It 




There is a Truth and Beauty in Rhetorick; but it oftener serves ill Turns than good 
ones. 
—William Penn  
 
For me, understanding agonism deepens and more specifically addresses the 
problems in the parlor which Catherine Lamb also addresses. Her critique of the parlor 
goes beyond concerns about adversativeness.  
The “you” in it takes it for granted that he is invited and can enter the parlor; he 
also seems to have no doubts about being able to speak, using the proper forms, 
and being listened to once he speaks. His challenges are only those of timing and 
strategy. I, on the other hand, ask who has been invited and who has been left out. 
Why should only these forms be used and not others? Must we assume an 
antagonistic relationship between participants? What other parties can we imagine 
that might continue the conversation? (“Voices” 155).  
As an undergraduate, I did not doubt my ability to speak, but I was frustrated with “the 
proper forms.” My desire to teach writing sprouted out of my frustration with TAs and 
professors who would penalize me for deviating from accepted forms, like not following 
the five-paragraph model (in an honor’s class!). As a result, it became my goal to reject 
formal rules such as never stating my thesis and still “being listened to” (which usually 
meant getting an A). Now as a graduate student, I do question my ability to speak after 
hazing seminar experiences that assumed “an antagonistic relationship between 
participants.” And I, as a student of rhetoric, continue to investigate challenges of “timing 
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and strategy” while I imagine with Lamb and others how this conversation, in form, 
tenor, and space, might continue differently.  
While I have seen much violence in discourse and education, unlike Gearhart, I 
have never seen persuasion as the important function of rhetoric. My reason for wanting 
to teach rhetoric was never an “attempt to educate others in that skill [of changing 
others]” (196). I always saw rhetoric as a deconstructive lens—as a faculty cultivated to 
help in cutting through crap. And crap is always violent.  
The feminists I have reviewed provide different answers to my opening question: 
“How do we reinforce discourse and buttress inquiry into the structure of our deliberative 
spaces?” For Jarratt, the answer is “a more rhetorical composition theory” (“Conflict” 
112). She would probably agree with Sloane and me that “we have not fully recovered 
the educational richness, or for that matter the humanity, of the rhetorical tradition” 
(Sloane 4). Like Karis, Jarratt and I feel the problem isn’t with changing the use of our 
tools but rather neglecting them. Karis argues that we need to “employ the entire range of 
tools at their disposal and not be coopted [sic] by calls or directives privileging 
cooperation and unity” (124). Although I would add we can equally be co-opted by calls 
for contest and dominance. Alexis Easley’s answer is to teach self-consciousness and 
reflectiveness in the wielding of our tools, or a rhetorical awareness that has the potential 
to salvage traditional argument and transform beyond the model of the “media 
wasteland” (Jarratt, “Reflections” 343). Catherine Lamb argues for forms that reflect 
ethical power relationships that function to keep the discoursive space, the space at the 
table, open regardless of whether or not we agree. In the end, I come back to the feminist 
project of inclusion. The integrity of our deliberative houses is measured by the degree to 
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